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This paper explores the puzzling question why the European Union (EU) – as a strong 
promoter of human rights in external affairs – does not seek accession to most of the 
United Nations (UN) human rights treaties. Several possible explanatory factors derived 
from preliminary research are examined: the EU’s internal and external context, the 
added value of accession, and the degree of internalization of the human rights norms 
in the EU. The example of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), to which 
the EU seeks to accede, is used for comparison. Based on an analysis of documents 
and secondary literature as well as interviews with various experts, the paper argues 
that the low level of internalization accounts best for the lack of EU interest in the 
ratification of the UN human rights treaties. The other variables are not really different 
from the case of the ECHR and make accession to the UN framework, in some aspects, 
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Introduction: Why Is the European Union not Joining UN Human Rights Treaties?  
 
Given the growing competences of the European Union (EU) and its image as a 
human rights actor, it seems surprising that there is almost no external human rights 
scrutiny of the Union’s actions by international bodies. Until 2011, when the EU ratified 
the United Nations Convention on Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), it was not 
a party to any human rights treaty.1 The Union makes significant efforts to accede to 
the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), but the prolonged accession 
negotiations did not yet come to fruition.2 In 2017, the EU has also decided to sign the 
Istanbul Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence Against Women.3 The 
European Parliament’s request for an opinion of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (CJEU) on the scope of this accession has been pending since April 2019.4 
 
Moreover, the EU has, so far, not initiated any ratification of human rights treaties 
adopted under the auspices of the United Nations (UN) other than the CRPD. UN 
human rights treaties (UNHRTs) are the core of international human rights law and most 
of them have achieved universal levels of ratification, including by all EU member 
states. They are therefore acknowledged as human rights standards. The European 
Union also embraces this universal understanding of human rights. What is more, it 
actively promotes the standards represented by the UNHRTs abroad.  
 
There are seemingly evident explanations for the EU’s lack of ratification of UN human 
rights treaties. It can be argued that between the late 1960s and the late 1980s, when 
most of them were negotiated and adopted, the European Community did not 
necessarily have the legal and diplomatic capacities to engage in the processes of 
negotiation and adoption of these treaties. The CRPD was drafted much later, 
between 2002 and 2006, with the European Commission’s involvement from the very 
                                                     
1 United Nations, “Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities”, United Nations Treaty 
Series, vol. 2515, New York, 2006, p. 3. 
2 Council of Europe, “Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms”, United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 213, Rome, 1950, p. 221. 
3 Council of Europe, “Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and 
domestic violence”, Council of Europe Treaty Series, no. 210, Istanbul, 2011.  
4 See European Parliament, Resolution of 4 April 2019 Seeking an Opinion from the Court Of 
Justice on the Compatibility with the Treaties of the Proposals for the Accession by the 
European Union to the Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence 
against Women and Domestic Violence and on the Procedure for that Accession, Brussels, 4 
April 2019, (2019/2678(RSP)). 
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beginning.5 Another reason may be the lack of regional and international 
organization (REIO) clauses in those treaties, which allow the EU, from a procedural 
point of view, to accede to UNHRTs. Although these factors cannot be dismissed, they 
should not be considered as insurmountable barriers as law is, after all, a construct. 
The EU has already proven that it is capable of questioning and transforming the 
traditional Westphalian order of international relations, from the creation of its own 
diplomatic corps – the European External Action Service (EEAS) – to its presence in fora 
such as the G20 and the United Nations General Assembly. Finally, the very same 
barriers were also present in the case of the European Convention of Human Rights, 
which did not have a REIO clause when it was adopted in 1950. It did not stop the EU 
from actively seeking ratification of the ECHR, a fact that makes this Convention an 
interesting case of comparison with UN human rights treaties. Hence, this paper aims 
to answer the following question: why does the European Union not seek accession to 
the UN human rights treaties (with the exception of the CRPD)? 
 
The next section explains the framework of analysis used to answer this research 
question. Further parts of the paper cover the examination of several possible 
explanatory factors: the EU’s internal and external context, the added value of 
accession, and the degree of internalization of the human rights norms in the EU. It 
ends with conclusions regarding the reasons for the EU’s inaction in the context of the 
UNHRTs and makes several recommendations addressed to the EU.  
 
Framework of Analysis  
 
UN human rights treaties is an umbrella term used by the UN itself and in the human 
rights literature, which denotes the nine core human rights treaties adopted under the 
auspices of the United Nations:  
1) International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (CERD) 
2) International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 
3) International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) 
                                                     
5 See United Nations, “Ad Hoc Committee on a Comprehensive and Integral International 
Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights and Dignity of Persons with 
Disabilities”, retrieved 2 April 2020, https://www.un.org/development/desa/disabilities/ 
resources/ad-hoc-committee-on-a-comprehensive-and-integral-international-convention-on-
the-protection-and-promotion-of-the-rights-and-dignity-of-persons-with-disabilities.html.   
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4) Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 
(CEDAW) 
5) Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment (CAT) 
6) Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) 
7) International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant 
Workers and Members of their Families (ICMW) 
8) International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced 
Disappearance (CED) 
9) Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD).6  
 
The phenomenon which I identify and seek to explain is that the fact that EU seems 
generally disinterested in the ratification of the UN human rights framework as a whole 
body of law (with the important exception of the CRPD).  
 
No single theoretical concept or approach is able to provide a complete explanation 
of this phenomenon. An initial review of the literature, especially on states’ 
participation in human rights treaties, and interviews conducted with human rights 
experts from the European Commission, the EEAS, the Fundamental Rights Agency, a 
national diplomatic service, the Council of Europe, civil society and academia, 
helped to identify the relevant factors. The first variable, the context, looks for possible 
explanations in the environment in which an accession would take place. This 
environment influences the EU’s ability to ratify the UNHRTs and defines potential costs 
of adaptation. The second variable, the added value, assumes an implicit benefit 
analysis in the EU’s behaviour towards the UNHRTs. The EU will only seek accession to a 
treaty if it anticipates significant benefits from this action. The context and the added 
value variables correspond to the ‘logic of consequence’ which presupposes that the 
                                                     
6 United Nations, “International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination”, United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 660, New York, 1966, p. 1; United Nations, 
“Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women”, United Nations 
Treaty Series, vol. 1249, New York, 1979, p. 1; United Nations, “Convention Against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment”, United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 
1465, New York, 1987, p. 85; United Nations, “Convention on the Rights of the Child”, United 
Nations Treaty Series, vol. 1577, New York, 1989, p. 3; United Nations, “International Convention 
on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families United 
Nations”, United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 2220, New York, 1990, p. 3; United Nations, 
“International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance”, 
United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 2716, New York, 2006, p. 3.  
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behaviour of international actors is rational.7 The third variable, the internalization of 
human rights norms, takes into account the EU’s attachment to and identification with 
the UN human rights framework. In this perspective, the EU’s identity influences its 
decision-making processes with regard to the ratification of human rights instruments. 
The internalization variable corresponds to the ‘logic of appropriateness’ in 
constructivist International Relations theory which highlights the importance of values 
and identity in decision-making.8  
 
The analysis will be guided by a comparative method. Different explanations of the 
EU’s inaction regarding the UNHRTs will be compared to the example of the European 
Convention on Human Rights. This case study has been selected because of its high 
explanatory potential. The ECHR represents an example of the EU’s active effort to join 
a human rights treaty and therefore contrasts with the EU’s attitude towards the 
UNHRTs. Furthermore, the ECHR shares important characteristics with the UN human 
rights framework: they both include broad catalogues of human rights − especially if 
we consider the development of the ECHR through the case law of the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) −, they both constitute well-established human rights 
law frameworks, and they did not envisage the accession of the EU in the first place. 
At the same time, the ECHR is in many ways different from the UNHRTs. It is European, 
not global in its scope. It is a single instrument and therefore requires a single 
ratification, as opposed to the many UNHRTs. Finally, it has an enforcement 
mechanism, the ECtHR, which contrasts with the non-binding complaint systems of the 
UN human rights treaty bodies. 
 
The material used in the analysis consists of primary sources such as treaties, EU 
legislation, official communications and other documents of EU institutions. This desk 
research was complemented by eight semi-structured interviews with experts. 
Regarding the secondary literature, there are rather few analyses of the EU’s 
relationship with the UNHRTs. Nevertheless, this paper relies on an extensive list of 
publications on issues such as internal-external policy coherence, the EU as human 
rights actor, the law of the EU’s external relations and the EU’s relationship with the 
ECHR. 
                                                     
7 See e.g. A. van Aaken, Rational Choice Theory, Oxford,  Oxford Bibliographies, 2015.  
8 See e.g. J.G. March & J.P. Olsen, “The Logic of Appropriateness”, in R.E. Goodin, M. Moran & 
M. Rein (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Public Policy, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008. 
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The research question has an underlying assumption that the EU, in fact, does not seek 
to accede to the UNHRTs, which cannot be taken at its face value. Yet, publicly 
available communications coming from the European Union do not provide any 
reasons to discard this assumption. Initial research, including interviews, confirmed that 
the Union is not considering binding itself by the existing UN human rights framework.  
 
The Context of a Possible Accession of the EU to UNHRTs 
 
Turning now to the factors potentially accounting for the EU’s inaction towards 
accession to the UN human rights treaties, I will first explore whether the internal 
context, that is the EU’s own legal order and political constellations, makes an 
accession difficult, before examining the external context.  
 
Internal Context in the EU 
 
The EU does not have a general competence in the field of human rights, which makes 
it more cumbersome to prove accordance of the EU’s actions with the principle of 
conferral, according to which the EU only has competences which were conferred on 
it by the member states (Art. 5(1) TEU). The European Convention on Human Rights has 
a clear advantage over the UN human rights treaties as not only the competence but 
also the obligation to accede to this instrument has been conferred on the European 
Union through a treaty provision (Article 6(2) TEU). Although none of the interviewees 
considered the lack of an explicit authorization in the Treaties as detrimental to the 
EU’s possible accession to the UNHRTs, some of them, notably EU officials, considered 
the incorporation of Article 6(2) in the TEU as an explanatory factor for the EU’s pursuit 
of accession to the ECHR over the UNHRTs, emphasizing the EU’s duty to join the 
European convention, while in the case of the UNHRTs no such duty exists and even 
the EU’s competence to ratify the treaties can be put into question.9 However, the 
discussion on the legal feasibility of accession to human rights treaties by the EU does 
not stop here, since the EU has successfully joined the UN Convention on Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities and the same cannot be said, at least until now, about the 
European Convention on Human Rights.  
 
                                                     
9 Interview with Charles-Michel Geurts, Deputy Head of the EU Delegation to Indonesia and 
Brunei, former Deputy Head of Division Human Rights, EEAS, via videoconference, 8 February 
2020; Interview with an Official, European Commission, via telephone, 27 February 2020. 
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Despite the lack of an explicit human rights competence given to the EU by the 
Treaties, it is widely acknowledged that human rights are a cross-cutting issue, 
meaning that anything, from trade to migration policy, can affect individual rights. 
According to Alston and Weiler, “it seems self-evident that in [the areas of EU 
competence] it is only the Community which could reasonably be considered to be 
the custodian of human rights” and therefore can, and moreover should, ensure the 
protection of human rights in those areas.10 This cross-cutting character of human 
rights seems to be recognized by the EU itself through the adoption of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights (CFEU) applicable to all EU actions.11 
 
The fear of the EU going beyond its conferred competences by acceding to human 
rights treaties is unfounded as the Union will only abide by a treaty to the extent 
covered by its competences.12 In comparison, the European Convention on Human 
Rights, and specifically its case law, relate to virtually any field of policy. For instance, 
a significant part of the standards developed under the ECHR relates to ensuring 
proper living conditions in prisons. This does, however, not mean that after the EU’s 
accession to the ECHR, the EU will have to implement standards related to prisons, 
among others, in which it clearly lacks competences. 
 
Any accession of the EU to an international agreement would have to fall within the 
scope of Article 216 TFEU as well as be consistent with the well-established case law 
on EU treaty-making powers. As discussed above, the Treaties do not confer on the EU 
an explicit competence to accede to UNHRTs. The accession is also not provided for 
in any legally binding Union act, which leaves two possibilities for the EU to join the 
UNHRTs under Article 216 TFEU – either an accession has to be necessary in order to 
achieve one of the objectives referred to in the Treaties or be likely to affect common 
rules or alter their scope. In my view, it is reasonable to consider the EU’s accession to 
UNHRTs as fulfilling each of these criteria. First, according to Article 3(1) TEU, the aim of 
the Union is to promote its values (under Article 2 TEU respect for human rights is one 
of them) and the well-being of its peoples, the very purpose which fundamental rights 
                                                     
10 P. Alston & J. Weiler, “An ‘Ever Closer Union’ in Need of a Human Rights Policy: the EU Union 
and Human Rights”, European Journal of International Law, vol. 9, no. 4, 1998, p. 679.  
11 European Union, “Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Official Journal of 
the European Union, C326/391, 2012. 
12 Interview with Dr. Israel Butler, Head of Advocacy, Civil Liberties Union for Europe, via 
videoconference, 6 April 2020. 
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stand for. Second, after the adoption of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, the EU has 
established common rules in the field of human rights which correspond to the 
provisions of the UNHRTs. The EU’s ratification of the UN human rights framework would 
therefore affect the common rules under the Charter.   
 
The case for the EU’s treaty-making competence is particularly strong for the UNHRTs 
relating to discrimination. In the case of the CRPD, it was Article 13 of the Treaty 
establishing the European Community (now Article 10 TFEU), a general anti-
discrimination provision, which was invoked as a legal basis. According to the Council, 
it assigned to the European Community an objective, whose achievement made it 
necessary for the Community to join the international agreement.13 The same legal 
basis and understanding can then follow in relation to the CERD and the CEDAW. In 
addition to Article 10 TFEU, the case for the EU’s competence in relation to the CEDAW 
is strengthened by the explicit formulation of gender equality objectives in the Treaties 
(Article 8 TFEU) as well as the adoption of corresponding legislation by the Union. An 
additional treaty basis (Article 67(3) TFEU) and common rules are also established in 
the area covered by the CERD. As the EU possesses what can be called a fully-fledged 
EU migration law and certainly ‘occupies’ a large part of the field under this shared 
competence, it can ratify the ICMW. As regards the CRC, the protection of children’s 
rights also represents an EU objective under Article 3(3) TEU and the EU has a broad 
acquis in this field. 
 
Would the EU’s accession, legally speaking, be more difficult for the more general 
compared to the more specific UNHRTs? As pointed out by one interviewee, the 
ratification of the CRPD was easier for the EU as the convention covered a specific 
policy field as opposed to the ICCPR, which could potentially cover all EU policies.14 A 
broad field of application certainly does not help to identify one single basis for 
ratification, but, on the other hand, a multiplicity of legal bases can result in stronger 
legal argumentation for accession. Issues such as the construction of a European 
citizenship, encompassing electoral and petition rights, as well as the data protection 
acquis will fall within the ambit of the ICCPR, as could many other pieces of EU 
legislation. The case for a ratification of the ICESCR by the European Union is made by 
                                                     
13 Council of the European Union, “Decision of 26 November 2009 Concerning the Conclusion, 
by the European Community, of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities”, Official Journal of the European Union, L 23/35, 2009. 
14 Interview with an Official, European Commission (…).  
EU Diplomacy Paper 7/2020 
11 
De Schutter and Butler who showed how the convention relates to EU policies such as 
agriculture or employment.15 Finally, a broad scope of application has not been 
considered as a legal barrier when it comes to the broad ECHR. 
 
The two remaining UNHRTs, the CAT and the CED, seemingly have not very much 
grounding in EU legislation, which is vaguely concerned with torture or enforced 
disappearance. It was, however, noticed by interviewees that the CAT can become 
increasingly more relevant with the EU’s growing acquis on detention conditions, 
migrant reception centres and criminal procedures as well as expanding 
competences of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (FRONTEX).16 The 
prohibition of torture is also enshrined in the CFEU and the ECHR. On the contrary, it is 
difficult to find the EU’s common rules or objectives related to the CED, although any 
policy field can have unintended impact on individual rights.  
 
From a procedural point of view, the ratification of UNHRTs should not pose more legal 
problems than the conclusion of any other international treaty by the European Union. 
However, some questions on how the procedure would look like remain open. 
Whereas in the case of the ECHR, the Treaties require the consent of the European 
Parliament for the conclusion, it is less clear with regard to the UN human rights 
framework.17 In the case of the CRPD only a consultation and not the consent of the 
European Parliament was sought. However, this treaty was adopted under the pre-
Lisbon treaty-making procedure, which gave less power to the Parliament.18 Under the 
current legal framework, it is more likely that the adoption of the UNHRTs would require 
the European Parliament’s consent as the treaties cover fields of ordinary legislative 
procedure (e.g. discrimination, migration, justice).19  
 
The ratification of the UNHRTs should not require a unanimous decision by the Council, 
a procedural advantage when compared to the ECHR for which the Treaties explicitly 
                                                     
15 O. De Schutter & I. Butler, "Binding the EU (…)”, pp. 315-318. 
16 Interview with Dr. Jonas Grimheden, Fundamental Rights Agency, via telephone, 31 January 
2020; Interview with Prof. Roman Wieruszewski, Poznań Human Rights Centre, Polish Academy 
of Sciences, former member of the United Nations Human Rights Committee, via telephone, 
18 February 2020.  
17 Art. 218(6)(a)(ii) TFEU.  
18 European Parliament, Legislative Resolution on the Proposal for a Council Decision 
Concerning the Conclusion, by the European Community, of the United Nations Convention 
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 24 April 2009, P6_TA(2009)0312. 
19 Art. 218(6)(aa)(v) TFEU.  
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require such decision.20 Finally, it is important to assess whether the UNHRTs would need 
ratification by all EU member states, as in the case of the ECHR, in order to enter into 
force for the EU.21 As none of the UNHRTs is limited in its substance to areas of EU 
exclusive competence, they would be concluded as mixed agreements. This should 
not pose a problem when it comes to most of the UNHRTs, already ratified by all EU 
members states. However, there are two conventions which may constitute a 
challenge: the IMCW (not ratified by any EU member state) and the CED (not ratified 
by Latvia, Hungary and Estonia).22  
 
One must also consider whether the ratification of UNHRTs by the EU would find the 
support of the CJEU, the ultimate arbiter when it comes to what is and what is not 
within the EU’s competences. Specifically, it is important to test this case against 
Opinion 2/94 in which the CJEU stated that the Union cannot accede to the ECHR 
without an explicit legal basis in its constitutional framework. In this ruling, the Court 
acknowledges that no Treaty provision confers on the institutions any general power 
to enact rules or conclude treaties in the field of human rights and states the absence 
of express or implied powers for the purpose of human rights protection.23 The Court 
concludes that the ratification of the ECHR entails “fundamental institutional implica-
tions (…) of constitutional significance” and entry of the Community “into a distinct 
international institutional system” as such would go beyond the scope of Article 235.24  
 
Although the Court does not recognize the EU’s general human rights competence, 
in stating that the Union cannot accede to the ECHR it focuses on the fact that such 
an accession would entail joining an elaborate institutional framework, consisting of a 
court and giving a significant role to political bodies in the appointment of judges and 
the enforcement of rulings. However, this is not the case with the UN human rights 
treaties and their ’soft’ treaty bodies. Accession to the UNHRTs should therefore not be 
perceived by the CJEU as having implications of constitutional significance. The 
ratification of the UN Convention on Rights of Persons with Disabilities did not give rise 
                                                     
20 Art. 218(8) TFEU. 
21 Ibid.  
22 UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Status of Ratification. Interactive 
Dashboard, 9 April 2020, retrieved 9 April 2020, https://indicators.ohchr.org.  
23 Court of Justice of the European Union, Opinion Pursuant to Article 228 of the EC Treaty - 
Accession by the Community to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms, Opinion 2/94, Luxembourg, 28 March 1996, ECLI:EU:C:1996:140, 
Opinion of the Court, par. 27-28. 
24 Ibid., par. 34-35. 
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to questions about its legality in light of Opinion 2/94 or to considerations of amending 
the Treaties (although the Court has never been given a chance to express its opinion 
on this convention). It can follow from this that the same should be the case for other 
UNHRTs.25  
 
Accession to the UNHRTs would also have to be tested against a possible encroach-
ment on the CJEU’s competences as laid down in Opinion 2/13.26 Certainly, UN human 
rights treaty bodies constitute less of a threat to the autonomy of the EU’s legal order 
than the European Court of Human Rights. As quasi-judicial organs, UN human rights 
treaty bodies are empowered to receive individual complaints. However, the 
procedures only apply to the parties which ratified the relevant optional protocols and 
they are in any case non-binding. This makes the UN conventions easier to ratify for 
the EU than the ECHR in light of the case law on the autonomy of the EU’s legal order, 
even if the EU chooses to also ratify the optional protocols. The EU institutions seem to 
follow this understanding as confirmed by the EU’s ratification of the CRPD, imposing 
reporting duties, and an initial interest in the ratification of the Optional Protocol to the 
CRPD.27  
 
Turning now to the EU’s internal political context, it is important to discuss whether there 
is or could be a political will to join the UNHRTs. The initiative to conclude a UNHRT 
should normally come from the Commission, but the EU’s human rights policies are 
cross-cutting and fall under the competences of various units, which does not make it 
easy to identify which ones are directly responsible.28 According to a Commission 
official, the discussion could be initiated in the Fundamental Rights Unit of the 
Directorate-General for Justice and Consumers (DG JUST), but they admit that 
according to their knowledge, no evaluations of the accession were made on any 
level at the Commission, except for the discussion on the Convention of the Rights of 
                                                     
25 I. Butler, The European Union and International Human Rights Law, United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, Regional Office for Europe, Brussels, 2008, p. 23. 
26 Court of Justice of the European Union, Opinion Pursuant to Article 218(11) TFEU - Draft 
International Agreement - Accession of the European Union to the European Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms - Compatibility of the Draft 
Agreement with the EU and FEU Treaties, Opinion 2/13, Luxembourg, 18 December 2014, 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:2454.  
27 European Parliament, Legislative Resolution on the Proposal for a Council Decision 
Concerning the Conclusion, by the European Community, of the Optional Protocol to the 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 24 April 2009, 
P6_TA(2009)0313.  
28 On fragmentation of EU human rights policies see e.g. P. Alston & J. Weiler, pp. 691-692. 
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the Child. They also point to the EEAS and the Legal Service of the Commission as 
relevant stakeholders.29  
 
The comparison with the ECHR does not shed enough light on the reasons for the 
Commission to seek accession to this treaty as opposed to the UNHRTs. Initially, in 1976 
the Commission concluded that the ratification of the ECHR would not be necessary 
for the Community but changed its mind in 1979.30 Since then, accession to the ECHR 
became a Commission-led project. The ability to initiate this endeavour and the 
Commission’s perseverance in handling the file for the last 40 years might be explained 
by several institutional factors. First, better knowledge of the ECHR system by 
Commission officials compared to the UN human rights framework. Second, the 
localization of the file within one unit – the Legal Service. As the experience of the EU’s 
accession to the CRPD shows, which was mainly handled by DG Employment, 
thematic UNHRTs would be dealt with in different units of the Commission. These 
institutional arrangements do not support the ratification of UNHRTs, a feat unlikely to 
be achieved without a coordinated strategy from the highest political management. 
The political priorities of the Commission do not include human rights. President von 
der Leyen’s strategy does not mention the accession to the ECHR, a significant 
omission for an issue of “constitutional significance”.31 
 
Although, legally speaking, the ratification of the UNHRTs might only need a qualified 
majority support in the Council, the institution is driven by consensus-seeking practice 
on the most important matters. This practice requires all member states to be on board 
for the EU’s accession to the UNHRTs, a process which they do not lobby for, but also 
do not necessarily oppose. Member states might find themselves balancing the 
advantages and disadvantages. On the one hand, the accession would stand for the 
EU’s more pronounced role in human rights protection.32 On the other hand, some 
member states may fear that the more the EU does in this field, the more it is likely to 
                                                     
29 Interview with an Official, European Commission (…).  
30 Commission of the European Communities, “The Protection of Fundamental Rights as 
Community Law is Created and Developed”, 4 February 1976, Bulletin of the European 
Communities, Supplement 5/76, par. 28; Commission of the European Communities, 
“Accession of the Communities to the European Convention on Human Rights”, 2 May 1979, 
Bulletin of the European Communities, Supplement 2/79. 
31 European Commission, A Union that Strives for More. My Agenda for Europe. Political 
Guidelines for the Next European Commission 2019-2024, Brussels, 10 September 2019. 
32 Interview with Mr. Jerzy Baurski, Head of the Department of the United Nations and Human 
Rights, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland, via e-mail, 19 February 2020.  
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take over some of their competences.33 Member states’ instincts seem to favour the 
latter conviction as evidenced from their initial opposition to the EU’s accession to the 
ECHR or the adoption of a legally-binding Charter of Fundamental Rights.34 In the end, 
the CFEU was adopted and the EU’s accession to the ECHR was enshrined as a treaty 
obligation, which shows that member states’ opposition can be refuted. There is no 
inherent reason for the member states not to support the EU’s accession to the UNHRTs 
as compared with the ECHR. It might in fact be less problematic as it entails few 
possibilities of encroachment on member states’ competences. Nevertheless, one of 
member states’ motivations for supporting the EU’s accession to the ECHR could be 
the interest in avoiding the payment of compensation for implementing flawed EU law 
as a result of ECtHR judgments, a problem which does not arise under the UNHRTs. It 
would also be illogical for member states to support the EU’s accession to instruments 
they did not ratify. This, however, would pose a problem only for the ICMW and the 
CED. Moreover, the same can also be said about several protocols to the ECHR which 
have not been ratified by all EU member states. 
 
The European Parliament has always been a strong human rights supporter. Since the 
late 1970s, the Parliament supported the accession to the European Convention on 
Human Rights35 as well as to the UN human rights treaties, namely the ICCPR and the 
ICESCR. The Spinelli Draft, a constitutional treaty draft of 1984 based on the initiative 
of the European Parliament, stated that the European Community shall accede to all 
of these three instruments.36 Since then, the European Parliament did not take a strong 
position on the EU’s accession to the UNHRTs and its general position on human rights 
oversight of the Union suggests a supportive attitude towards the ratification of 
UNHRTs. In 2011 a study on the implementation of the CEDAW commissioned by the 
European Parliament recommended the EU’s accession to the Convention.37 In 
                                                     
33 Ibid.; Interview with Prof. Jan Wouters, Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies, KU 
Leuven, Bruges, 4 February 2020.  
34 Opinion 2/94, pp. 1772-1782; G. De Búrca, “The Drafting of the European Union Charter of 
Fundamental Rights”, European Law Review, vol. 26, no. 2, 2001, pp. 126-138.  
35 Commission of the European Communities, “Accession (…)”, par. 6-7; European Parliament, 
EU Accession to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), European Parliamentary 
Research Service, Briefing, Brussels, July 2017, pp. 5-6. 
36 European Parliament, “Draft Treaty Establishing the European Union of 14 February 1984”, 
Bulletin of the European Communities, February 1984, no 2. Luxembourg, art. 4(3). 
37 European Parliament, How Could the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) Be Implemented in the EU Legal Framework?, Brussels, 
2011, p. 19. 
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addition, the Parliament’s resolution on children rights from 2019 explicitly calls on the 
Commission to explore how the EU can accede to the CRC.38  
 
Another possible obstacle for the EU to join UN human rights treaties are legal and 
political challenges external to the Union.  
 
External Context outside the EU 
 
The international legal framework was not designed with a supranational organization, 
such as the European Union, in mind, and the UN human rights system is a reflection of 
that. None of the UNHRTs to which the EU is not a party can currently be ratified by 
non-state actors. All the interviewees referred to this fact. However, none of them 
treated the lack of REIO clauses in the UNHRTs as the sole explanatory factor for the 
EU’s inaction without considering the possibility of adapting the current international 
framework to the EU’s needs. 
 
The European Convention on Human Rights was a states-only club up until 2010, when 
Article 17 of Protocol no. 14 amending the Convention entered into force.39 The 
amendment stated that the European Union may accede to the ECHR. Nevertheless, 
the EU was preparing to join the ECHR way before it was feasible from the point of the 
Convention itself. First declarations of interest in joining the ECHR came from the 
Commission’s communications in 1979. Legally speaking, nothing precludes 
amending the UNHRTs with a clause allowing for the EU’s accession as it has been 
done in the case of the ECHR. However, the difference lays in numbers. First, amending 
the UNHRTs with EU-specific or general REIO clauses would require initiating not just 
one, but eight amendment procedures. Second, as membership of UNHRTs is in each 
case larger compared to the ECHR, the number of states which need to ratify an 
amendment for it to enter into force makes it more difficult to amend UN conventions 
when compared to those of the Council of Europe.  
 
The difference, however, may not be as big as it seems. Although the ECHR does not 
lay down its amendment procedure, the drafters of Protocol no. 14 required all parties, 
                                                     
38 European Parliament, Resolution on Children’s Rights on the Occasion of the 30th Anniversary 
of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, 26 November 2019, P9_TA(2019)0066, par. 5.  
39 Council of Europe, “Protocol No. 14 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms, Amending the Control System of the Convention”, Strasbourg, 
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meaning 47 states, to ratify the Protocol in order for it to enter into force.40 This 
amendment of the ECHR was, however, not sufficient for the EU to become a party to 
this treaty. The last version of the draft agreement allowing for the EU’s accession to 
the ECHR, which is now being redrafted due to its inconsistency with EU law in light of 
Opinion 2/13, further amends the Convention and requires ratification of all parties to 
the ECHR and the European Union for the agreement to enter into force.41 The 
adoption of an amendment to the ICCPR, the ICESCR, the CRC and the ICMW requires 
approval of the UN General Assembly (simple majority vote) and the acceptance of 
two thirds of the parties.42 The CAT and the CED require only ratification by two thirds 
of the parties.43 The CEDAW and the CERD do not have specific amendment 
procedures. In these cases, Article 40 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of the 
Treaties applies, under which any proposed amendment to a treaty can be effectively 
adopted.44 After the introduction of amendments to the UNHRTs, the EU only needs to 
ratify the treaties – no subsequent agreements requiring the ratification of all state 
parties seem to be necessary. 
 
There are some alternative options to the still cumbersome amending procedures 
under the UNHRTs. It could be done by way of optional protocols to each treaty which, 
as the practice of the UN human rights framework suggests, would not have to be 
ratified by the whole membership to enter into force. The interviewees also 
contemplated the idea of an EU ‘observer status’ at the UN human rights bodies as an 
option not requiring ratification of the UNHRTs which would allow the EU to have some 
level of involvement in the UN system, e.g. voluntary reporting.45 Given the complexity 
of ECHR’s enforcement system, such alternative options are not available in the case 
of the European Convention.  
 
                                                     
40 Art. 19 Protocol no. 14.  
41 Art. 10(3) Appendix I, Council of Europe, European Union, Fifth Negotiation Meeting between 
the CCDH Ad Hoc Negotiation Group and the European Commission on the Accession of the 
European Union to the European Convention on Human Rights, Final Report to the CDDH, 
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43 Art. 29(2) CAT, Art. 44(3) CED. 
44 United Nations, “Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties”, United Nations Treaty Series, 
vol. 1155, Vienna, 1969.  
45 Interview with Dr. Jonas Grimheden (…); Interview with Dr. Israel Butler (…); Interview with Mr. 
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Following this consideration of legal challenges, the paper now explores the external 
political context. Both the United Nations and the Council of Europe (CoE) have 
established relations with the EU. Nevertheless, the relationship with the Council of 
Europe seems to be more intense, partnership-oriented and centralized, with the 
adoption of a Memorandum of Understanding illustrating this fact.46 As stated by the 
Deputy Head of the CoE office in Brussels, there is a willingness on the part of the 
Council of Europe to attract the EU to the Pan-European working methods and 
standards and the need for CoE-EU cooperation is regularly reaffirmed.47 The Council 
of Europe devotes a lot of its resources to accommodate the EU’s ratification of the 
ECHR and has engaged in negotiations on the accession.48 The UN human rights-
related bodies have recently also become more involved with the EU. According to 
the interviewees, UN special rapporteurs interact more and more with the EU rather 
than its member states, and the chairs of the UN human rights treaty bodies actively 
seek opportunities to make the system more known to EU decision-makers, for instance 
by organizing joint visits to Brussels.49 The quality of the recently started cooperation 
between the EU and the CRPD Committee may determine the later attitudes of some 
UN bodies towards the EU.  
 
When analyzing the attitudes of the UN and the CoE member states towards the EU 
and its accession to human rights instruments, one must start with the obvious – the 
membership of the United Nations is roughly four times bigger than the one of the 
Council of Europe and certainly more diverse. This makes the EU’s inclusion more 
difficult, as can be exemplified with the EU’s experience of obtaining an enhanced 
observer status at the UN General Assembly in 2010-11, which was first met with 
opposition from several UN groupings. The case is exemplary for the attitude of the UN 
membership towards accommodating the EU’s inclusion. Yet, contrary to the case of 
the UN General Assembly, the EU’s accession to the UNHRTs would not give any 
additional rights to the EU or EU member states, which could put other parties in a 
disadvantageous position. These concerns are more pronounced in the case of the 
ECHR as the Council of Europe is already dominated by EU member states (27 out of 
                                                     
46 Council of Europe, European Union, Memorandum of Understanding Between the Council 
of Europe and the European Union, 23 May 2007, Strasbourg.  
47 Interview with Mr. Humbert de Biolley (…).  
48 See Council of Europe, European Union, Fifth Negotiation Meeting (…), Final report to the 
CDDH and Appendix IV, par. 7.  
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47 members) and these power dynamics have an impact on the decisions of the 
Committee of Ministers, which is responsible for the enforcement of Court’s rulings. In 
the case of the UNHRTs, UN member states should not be as worried compared to 
members of the Council of Europe given that the EU’s accession is unlikely to have any 
major political consequences. The lack of opposition from other parties to the EU’s 
accession to the CRPD illustrates that UN member states have no reasons not to be 
open to the ratification of other UNHRTs by the EU.50  
 
Added Value for the EU 
 
This section examines the added value of the EU’s accession to the UNHRTs for internal 
EU policies and for its external action.  
 
Added Value for Internal EU Policies 
 
The added value of accession to human rights treaties, understood mostly as 
enhanced protection of human rights for EU citizens, has been one of the most 
prevalent topics in the interviews conducted for this research. A deficit of protection 
of individuals’ rights resulting from shifting the competences from EU member states to 
the Union has been acknowledged as the rationale for the EU’s decision to join the 
ECHR.51 The potential of covering this protection gap has been identified also as 
a reason why the EU may prioritize an accession to the ECHR over the UNHRTs.52  
 
The lack of external scrutiny of the EU’s actions is indeed a problem which needs to be 
addressed for the sake of the rights of individuals. Most EU legislation is implemented 
through member states’ actions which allows human rights bodies to scrutinize EU 
acquis through examining the human rights records of individual EU countries. 
According to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, the EU member 
states remain accountable for the implementation of EU law which may infringe on 
the human rights of individuals.53 Consequently, applicants can (and do) address 
                                                     
50 See United Nations, “Ad Hoc Committee on a Comprehensive and Integral International 
Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights and Dignity of Persons with 
Disabilities”, retrieved 2 April 2020, https://www.un.org/development/desa/disabilities/ 
resources/ad-hoc-committee-on-a-comprehensive-and-integral-international-convention-on-
the-protection-and-promotion-of-the-rights-and-dignity-of-persons-with-disabilities.html.   
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53 European Court of Human Rights, Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm Ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi v. 
Ireland, Grand Chamber, app. no. 45036/98, Strasbourg, 30 June 2005, par. 154.  
Monika de Silva 
20 
member states in the Court for violations resulting from the implementation of EU law. 
The same holds for UN human rights treaty bodies, which receive individual complaints 
and state reports related to EU law as well. There are certainly important gaps which 
would be filled by the EU’s accession to human rights treaties, especially in the area 
where the EU acts without the intermediary role of its member states. The direct 
participation of the EU in human rights procedures should also add more legal 
certainty (as currently the interpretations under EU law and international human rights 
law risk divergence). Besides, it would add a general feeling of accountability of EU 
institutions for their actions which would be beneficial for the protection of the rights 
of individuals. It should be noticed that a direct beneficiary of the EU’s accession to 
human rights instruments is also the EU itself. The Union has an interest in ensuring the 
effectiveness of EU law by relieving its member states from the dilemma of having to 
apply EU legislation challenged by international human rights institutions and gaining 
the ability to defend its own legislation in front of international bodies. The EU’s 
accession would also benefit member states which would not have to participate in 
reporting and court procedures when they are related to EU law, and in the case of 
the ECHR, pay compensation for breaches resulting from the implementation of 
flawed EU law. This self-interested logic for the EU’s accession to the ECHR has been 
admitted by the Commission in its early analyses.54 
 
In this context of internal benefits of EU accession to human rights instruments, it is 
worthwhile to compare the added value provided by the ECHR and the UNHRTs. 
When it comes to ad hoc human rights verification, the ECHR undoubtedly is 
encompassed with a stronger instrument – the European Court of Human Rights – with 
a power to issue legally binding judgments and award compensation for breaches of 
the Convention. Although under the UNHRTs, an individual may also use a complaint 
procedure, its result will not have a binding effect (which does, however, not mean 
that decisions of UN human rights bodies have no legal significance). The treaty bodies 
are also not competent to award remedies like financial compensation. Moreover, 
the individual complaint procedures will only concern the EU if it chooses to ratify 
optional protocols to the UNHRTs. However, the strength of the UN human rights 
framework may lay in a different type of human rights verification – reporting. Under 
the UNHRTs, parties are obliged to systematically and cyclically conduct a review of 
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their actions and legislation to self-assess their compliance and implementation of the 
treaties’ provisions. The reports are then thoroughly examined by the treaty bodies, 
composed of impartial human rights experts, and discussed with the parties. At the 
end of the process, the bodies issue recommendations and expect a follow-up. As 
these recommendations are not legally binding, their effectiveness may vary. In the 
case of the EU, the importance of reporting to treaty bodies may already be observed 
in the case of the reports submitted to the CRPD Committee. The procedure has 
already resulted in large scale mobilization of civil society actors drawing up their own 
‘shadow reports’ on the EU’s performance. The European Parliament called on the 
Commission to implement all the recommendations issued by the CRPD Committee.55 
Since an a prori assessment of fundamental rights carried out by the EU institutions is 
often very superficial, as stated by Butler, the scrutiny of treaty bodies should motivate 
the EU to treat this checking activity more seriously.56 Needless to say, the ECHR is not 
equipped with this kind of reporting mechanism and its human rights check depends 
largely on individuals’ willingness to engage in a procedure in front of the ECtHR, a 
rather lengthy and complicated process. A regular and systematic check, as 
performed under the UNHRTs, has the advantage of potentially conducting 
assessments of a larger part of actions and laws, and it shifts the burden of 
engagement from individuals to the contracting parties. 
 
The UN human rights system also has another advantage – it covers a broader 
catalogue of human rights than its European counterpart. The ECHR is largely 
concerned with political and civil rights, although its scope has been progressively 
broadened thanks to the development of the ECtHR’s case law. It is somehow strange 
that the EU devotes most of its energy related to the ratification of human rights 
instruments to this particular convention since, as admitted by the Commission itself, 
EU legislation mostly touches upon social and economic rights of individuals.57 
Although the Commission initially did not decide to work on the second generation of 
human rights, because of the lack of agreement among member states on their 
character and scope, nowadays all EU member states are parties to the International 
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Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which provides a common 
understanding.58 De Schutter and Butler postulated that the EU should take the positive 
aspects of human rights obligations more seriously. They argue that the EU human 
rights approach is mostly built on the EU’s presumption that it is enough to ensure that 
its actions do not negatively affect the rights of individuals.59 The ICESCR is better 
equipped to remedy this issue compared to the ECHR, given the second generation 
rights’ character of a positive obligation. 
 
Added Value for External EU Policies 
 
The fulfilment of the EU’s foreign policy goals has been identified by some of the 
interviewees as a main reason why the Union should join the UNHRTs.60 This could 
promote and authenticate EU as a human rights actor and give it more recognition in 
the international arena.  
 
One of the objectives of the EU’s external action is, according to Article 21(2)(b) TEU, 
the consolidation and support for human rights. EU human rights promotion is now a 
fully-fledged policy and was mainstreamed in different external engagements of the 
Union. The new Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy 2020-2024 recognizes 
the need to enhance EU leadership in promoting and protecting human rights 
worldwide.61 The document defines the promotion of the global system for human 
rights as one of the main objectives of this policy area.62 It envisages cooperation and 
coordination with UN human rights treaty bodies and seeks to strengthen their 
effectiveness.63 Advocacy for the ratification and implementation of relevant UN 
conventions and optional protocols is seen as one of the main tools for the EU’s policy 
of human rights promotion.64 The EU also promotes the UNHRTs through other external 
actions. The human rights dimension of trade policy is a notable example. Trade 
agreements with third countries consider the compliance with international human 
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rights law as an essential element of the agreements, which allows for their suspensions 
in the case of grave human rights violations perpetrated by a party. Unilateral trade 
schemes developed by the EU require their beneficiaries to comply with important UN 
human rights treaties in order to enjoy preferential treatment.65 Human rights 
compliance is also promoted through enlargement and the European Neighbour-
hood Policy. 
 
Accession to the UNHRTs will be beneficial for fostering the EU’s image as an 
international human rights promoter. By joining the core UN human rights conventions 
the EU would represent the example of what it recommends third countries to do. 
Besides, the accession of the Union would endorse and promote the UN human rights 
system itself, which is another goal of the EU’s human rights policy.66 The reporting 
systems of the UN human rights treaty bodies would also give the EU additional means 
of exercising its normative power. By sharing its practices on the implementation of 
provisions of human rights treaties in reports which are publicly available and subject 
to the scrutiny of human rights experts, the EU may better succeed in transferring its 
standards and ideas to third countries and ‘uploading’ them to the international level.  
 
Most importantly, EU accession to the UNHRTs will be beneficial for the coordination of 
largely separate external and internal human rights policies and foster the EU’s 
credibility in human rights promotion. The separate formulation of its internal and 
external human rights policies risks resulting in incoherence.67 Consequently, the EU 
uses different benchmarks for itself and for its external partners when evaluating 
human rights performance. It is especially visible in the case of the UNHRTs, which are 
brought up in externally oriented human rights communication to an incomparably 
larger extent than when EU institutions assess their own human rights performance. 
Article 21(3) TEU obliges the EU to ensure consistency between its internal and external 
policies and the need to implement this provision in the area of human rights policy 
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has been recognized in the 2020 Action Plan.68 Joining the UNHRTs will help the EU 
achieve internal-external consistency as it will be forced to start using references and 
benchmarks of the UN human rights system also to evaluate its own actions.   
 
The ratification of the UNHRTs will also lead to enhanced credibility in the EU’s human 
rights dialogues with third countries, by showing the EU’s tangible commitment to the 
same standards it promotes as well as the confirmation from the treaty bodies that EU 
policies are in fact compatible (or not) with the UNHRTs. “That the EU is exemplary in 
respecting fundamental rights is vital (…) a strong track record will strengthen the EU’s 
action to promote human rights around the world” reads the communication of the 
High Representative and the Commission.69 The document recognizes that in order to 
be credible the EU should “visibly and effectively” implement UN and Council of 
Europe standards, to which it holds third countries accountable.70 It also considers the 
EU’s commitment to accede to the European Convention on Human Rights as raising 
the Union’s credibility in its external human rights policy.71  
 
Accession to the UNHRTs should also benefit the realization of more general objectives 
of EU external action. Since the adoption of the Treaty of Lisbon, the EU’s foreign policy 
capabilities were strengthened in order to allow the EU to function better in a still 
largely Westphalian international order. Although important practices have been 
developed in order to accommodate the EU’s presence in international relations, 
including the role of the EU Delegations or the High Representative, the EU is still striving 
for a full recognition as a diplomatic actor.72 Many international organizations still do 
not allow the EU to become a member, and the EU seeks to change this, as evidenced 
by the strategy on the improvement of the EU’s status in international organizations.73 
The international fora progressively acknowledge the EU’s participation and all recent 
UN and Council of Europe conventions allow for its accession. Joining the UNHRTs 
                                                     
68 European Commission & High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy, EU Action Plan (…), p. 4.  
69 European Commission, High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy, Human Rights (…), p. 14.  
70 Ibid., p. 15.  
71 Ibid.  
72 See R. Adler-Nissen, “Symbolic Power in European Diplomacy: The Struggle Between National 
Foreign Services and the EU’s External Action Service”, Review of International Studies, vol. 40, 
no. 4, 2014, pp. 657-681.   
73 European Commission, Strategy for the Progressive Improvement of the EU Status in 
International Organizations and Other Fora in Line with the Objectives of the Treaty of Lisbon, 
C(2012) 9420 final, 20 December 2012 (& Annex). 
EU Diplomacy Paper 7/2020 
25 
would yet again legitimate and confirm that the EU, even though not a state, is a part 
of the international order. It would also be an important affirmation of the EU’s 
commitment to multilateralism, as enshrined in Article 21(2)(h) TEU.74 
 
After examining the factors related to the cost-benefit analysis of the EU’s accession 
to UN human rights treaties, the paper now turns to a different explanatory factor, the 
logic of appropriateness, which views actors as doing what seems rightful for them 
and aligns with their systems of values. 
 
Internalization of human rights norms 
 
A constructivist approach to the ratification of human rights treaties means that 
signatories join these instruments to affirm their sincere commitment to treaty principles 
since “the notions of rights and identity inevitably go together”.75 The level of 
internalization of human rights norms by the EU, meaning the integration of values and 
standards in the EU’s own identity could perhaps explain the variation in its accession 
to human rights treaties.  
 
It is not contested that the EU internalizes both universal and European human rights 
standards, however, it does so to different degrees. All interviewees pointed out this 
difference. Phrases like “common European standards” (meaning EU and ECHR 
standards put together) or “the special status of the ECHR in the EU” frequently 
appeared in these discussions.76 One interviewee referred to the European 
Convention as “being closer to home” for the EU.77 Another interlocutor said that the 
ECHR is a “part of the understanding of the EU itself”.78 Several interviewees also 
referred to the historical and geographical reasons for the EU’s closer relationship with 
the ECHR than with the UNHRTs.79 Academic literature also points to the notion of 
European identity as an explaining factor of the EU’s effort to join the ECHR. As put by 
Alton and Weiler, “the European Convention system has become more than a legal 
safety net. It is now a part of the cultural self-definition of European civilization”.80 
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Williams notes that by acceding to the ECHR, the EU aspires to become “a part of the 
greater Europe”.81 The lack of such a pompous discourse on UN human rights treaties 
is striking.  
 
Interestingly, when asked about the reason of the special status of the ECHR for the 
EU, the notion of values often recurred in the interviews.82 The representative of the 
Council of Europe noted that the UN values are not different, but the way of exercising 
the values, through strong judicial mechanism, brings the EU closer to the ECHR.83 The 
expert of the Fundamental Rights Agency pointed to the fact that the European 
Convention focuses on political and civil rights and that historically this generation of 
rights was also more present in the EU.84 The privileging of first generation civil and 
political rights by the Union over second generation rights is also noted in the 
academic literature.85 It is difficult to find differences in the systems of values 
represented as such by the European and the UN human rights framework, as they 
both form part of international human rights law based on the same core principle of 
inalienable human dignity. The perception of axiological differences should 
nevertheless be considered as an important observation which translates into the level 
of EU’s identification with different human rights frameworks.  
 
Starting from the provisions of the EU treaties, there is evidence of deeper socialization 
of the EU within the ECHR system than the UN human rights framework. Article 6(3) TEU 
provides that fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the ECHR, constitute general 
principles of the Union’s law. It is evident from this provision that the ECHR already has 
a legally binding status within the EU order, which contrasts with “the precarious legal 
position of other international human rights conventions”.86 UN human rights treaties 
are not given any legally qualified status in EU law, and UNHRTs are not mentioned in 
the EU Treaties.   
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The CFEU is particularly important in this context as the EU conducts its internal human 
rights check based on its provisions. In its preamble, the CFEU reaffirms the rights as 
they result from “international obligations common to the member states”. These 
obligations evidently include most of the UNHRTs, although the Charter does not make 
this direct reference. In contrast, explicit mentions of the ECHR as well as the case law 
of the ECtHR are made in the preamble.  
 
Special interpretative importance is assigned to the ECHR by virtue of Article 52(3) 
CFEU, according to which a right guaranteed by the Charter shall be given the same 
meaning and scope as by the ECHR when this right is also protected by the latter. 20 
out of 50 provisions of the Charter fall into this category.87 The obligation of consistent 
application does not only concern the wording of the ECHR, but also the case law of 
the ECtHR.88 No such interpretative guideline is laid down for the UNHRTs.  
 
Although, according to Article 53 CFEU, nothing in the Charter can be interpreted as 
restricting or adversely affecting rights as recognized by international law and 
international agreements to which the Union or all the member states are parties, 
again an explicit reference is made only to the ECHR. This negative obligation not only 
restricts rights already provided, but it has, in addition, a far narrower scope than the 
positive obligation of uniform interpretation of the Charter and the ECHR. The lower 
level of internalization of UNHRTs is also evident from the limited number of references 
made in the official explanations relating to the CFEU. There are only two instances of 
using the ICCPR as an interpretative tool and one instance of referral to the CRC.89 
The evidently more pronounced grounding of the CFEU in the ECHR rather than the 
UNHRTs should not come as a surprise as members of the Council of Europe and the 
European Court of Human Rights were invited to the drafting process of the Charter, 
in itself an indication of the strong internalization of the ECHR norms in the EU.90 
Although other bodies, including the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, sent their recommendations to the drafting Convention of the Charter to 
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incorporate references to the UN human rights instruments, they have not been met 
with the drafters’ approval.91 The Charter of Fundamental Rights, the synonym of the 
EU’s human rights identity, is therefore profoundly and deliberately an expression of 
the EU’s identification with the ECHR and evidence of the EU’s looser connection to 
the UNHRTs.  
 
The strong affiliation with the ECHR is also reflected in the case law of the CJEU. The 
“special significance” of this Convention in the EU legal order is regularly reiterated by 
the CJEU in its judgments.92 The Court frequently refers to the ECHR to support its 
argumentation, but it rarely does so in the case of UN human rights treaties.93 The CJEU 
will never draw on the UNHRTs where their provisions go beyond the European 
Convention.94 In the Grant case, the Court explicitly dismissed the communication of 
a UN human rights treaty body, the Human Rights Committee.95 The tight relationship 
between CJEU and ECtHR judgments is reinforced by relationships of more personal 
nature as judges of the courts have regular informal interactions at conferences and 
special meetings, and some judges of the ECtHR have later been appointed to the 
CJEU.96 
 
In its strategic documents and communication, the EU also highlights its special 
relationship with the ECHR, a status which is not accorded to the UNHRTs. From the 
beginning of the consideration of joining the ECHR, the European Commission referred 
to “the protection of the Western European heritage” as a reason for accession.97 Both 
the Commission’s and the Council’s implementation strategies for the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, on the basis of which the EU institutions conduct the human rights 
compatibility check of their policies, put the ECHR at the centre of attention. However, 
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they also list UNHRTs as relevant sources of interpretation of the EU’s human rights 
obligations.98  
 
The EU’s internalization of human rights regimes not only varies with regard to the 
intensity of the relationship and frequency of its confirmation, but also depending on 
the policy fields. As discussed above, the EU makes use of the UNHRTs in its external 
communication and actions. UNHRTs are therefore internalized by the EU as a 
benchmark to which it holds third countries accountable, while the ECHR is the 
standard with which the EU self-identifies and which it strives to implement in its internal 
policies. This dichotomy of identity is evident in the language the EU uses, employing 
words like “fundamental rights”, “protection”, “values” and “commitment” in internal 
policies and “human rights”, “promotion”, “legal norms”, “respect” in external 
action.99  
 
Conclusion: Internalization as key reason for the EU’s inaction 
 
This paper explored the puzzling question why the EU – as a strong promoter of human 
rights in external affairs – does not seek accession to most of the UN human rights 
treaties. The often-cited arguments for the EU’s lack of willingness to accede to the 
UNHRTs, such as the absence of REIO clauses in those instruments, stop at a superficial 
level and do not provide enough explanatory power. Several possible explanatory 
factors were examined: the EU’s internal and external context, the added value of 
accession, and the degree of internalization of the human rights norms in the EU. The 
low level of internalization accounts best for the lack of EU interest in the ratification of 
the UN human rights treaties. The other variables are not very different from the case 
of the ECHR.  
 
From an internal legal standpoint, the EU has a competence to join most, if not all, of 
the UNHRTs. In some aspects, accession should in fact be less problematic than the 
ECHR as the UN human rights system would not be encroaching on the autonomy of 
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the EU’s legal order and the competences of the CJEU. The lack of strong political 
support for the EU’s accession to the UNHRTs stems from a low prioritization of the 
matter on the part of all actors involved, rather than from an opposition to the idea as 
such. The ECHR benefited here from the assignment of a clear responsibility to one 
single unit within the Commission. The external context, although more complex and 
involving more actors in case of the UNHRTs, is also more flexible, and does not 
constitute a barrier which cannot be passed, neither from a legal nor from a political 
perspective. Both the ECHR and the UNHRTs are of great added value for the 
protection of fundamental rights within the EU. Moreover, a ratification of the UN 
framework would give the EU tangible benefits in its external policies through a 
consolidation of its credibility as a human rights promoter and important player in 
multilateral fora. Nevertheless, given the evidence spread out throughout the EU’s 
founding treaties, internal fundamental rights instruments, jurisprudence and policy 
discourse, the ECHR embodies a system of human rights which is internalized by the 
Union to a clearly higher extent than the UNHRTs. Therefore, the latter’s’ lower level of 
internalization helps to explain the EU’s inaction. 
 
The question remains whether these findings still hold in the light of the exception – the 
EU’s accession to the CRPD. There is no evidence which would suggest that this UN 
treaty is more internalized in the EU than other UNHRTs. As observed by de Búrca, the 
EU’s participation in the drafting of the treaty allowed it to upload some of its norms to 
the international level, an important external policy objective, with also likely internal 
benefits (such as reputational added value in the eyes of its own citizens).100 As 
explained by one of the interviewees, the decision to join the CRPD was dictated by 
the fact that the EU was elaborating its own legislation on the protection of persons 
with disabilities, more or less at the same time as the drafting of the Convention.101 
I conclude from these observations that the EU’s low level of internalization of the 
UNHRT framework has in the case of the CRPD been outbalanced by important 
additional benefits, in particular the possibility of uploading EU norms to an 
international treaty, and benefitted from more conducive internal and external 
contexts.  
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On the basis of these findings, several recommendations can be formulated. First, the 
tasks related to the EU’s compliance with UN human rights framework should be 
delimited and explicitly inscribed into the responsibilities of particular units within the 
European Commission and the European External Action Service. Second, the EU 
should conduct a proper analysis of the feasibility of its accession to UN human rights 
treaties. The units which could be engaged in this process are the Fundamental Rights 
Unit of DG JUST in the European Commission, the Legal Service of the Commission, the 
Human Rights Division in the EEAS, the Special Representative for Human Rights and 
the Fundamental Rights Agency. Additionally, other Commission units should be 
included in the process of analysis for specific thematic conventions. The services 
responsible for the conclusion and implementation of the CRPD may be able to share 
valuable experience on the matter. This internal exercise must be supplemented by 
an engagement with the UN and its membership in order to assess the possibility of 
accession. Moreover, the EU should stay active in the development of a new UN treaty 
on Business and Human Rights as well as other UN human rights initiatives which may 
arise in the future.102  
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